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Abstract
In participatory budgeting we are given a set of projects—each with a
cost, an available budget, and a set of voters who in some form express
their preferences over the projects. The goal is to select—based on voter
preferences—a subset of projects whose total cost does not exceed the bud-
get. We propose several aggregation methods based on the idea of cumu-
lative votes, e.g., for the setting when each voter is given one coin and she
specifies how this coin should be split among the projects. We compare our
aggregation methods based on (1) axiomatic properties, and (2) computer
simulations. We identify one method, Minimal Transfers over Costs, that
demonstrates particularly desirable behavior. In particular, it significantly
improves on existing methods, satisfies a strong notion of proportionality,
and, thus, is promising to be used in practice.
1 Introduction
The idea of Participatory Budgeting (PB) was born in Brazil during the 1980s
when political reformers explored ways to move beyond the political system as-
sociated with Brazils military dictatorship (1964-1985) based on exclusion and
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corruption [28]. They aimed to increase transparency of decision making of local
bodies, hoping to enhance social justice and democracy [7]. At the first stage of
PB, governments and civil society organizations identify the set of goals on the
basis of certain principles without any reference to the budget. For example, many
PB programs in Brazil use the Quality of Life Index, initially devised by the gov-
ernment in the city of Belo Horizonte. These goals are translated into particular
projects that will be offered to the whole society to choose from. The second stage
is actual voting in which voters express their views on the relative importance of
the projects on offer. Thus, Participatory Budgeting is indeed a direct-democracy
approach to budgeting.
The most prominent applications of PB have been at the level of municipality,
where a fraction of the municipal budget is decided through a residents-wide elec-
tion. Other applications include, for example, (1) An airline company deciding
which movies to offer on its in-flight entertainment system [25], where license
costs for different movies can vary; and (2) A fans-owned soccer club wishing to
sign deals with athletes.
Lately, PB has gained a considerable attention, and an increasing amount of funds
are currently distributed this way1, thus the task of the research community is to
gain understanding of its foundations, the properties of the existing procedures,
and to suggest new more efficient procedures. The survey of some existing proce-
dures is given in [3].
It is the second stage of PB which is of interest to us in this paper. We there-
fore assume that there is a set of projects, each with its own cost, a set of voters
expressing their preferences over the projects, and a budget limit. The task of an
aggregation procedure is to select a subset of the projects on offer reflecting voter
preferences in the best possible way and whose total cost does not exceed the
budget limit. (Formal definitions are given later). One of the motivating factors
of our research is the close resemblance of participatory budgeting to multiwin-
ner elections—in fact, when the costs of projects are all equal to one, the model
for PB collapses to the model for multiwinner elections when a commitee of k
candidates is to be elected (so k in this case is the budget).
Even though the interest of ordinary people and political activists in PB is
steadily increasing and its adoption has been steadily on the rise, the research
on voting procedures for PB is still scarce. Specifically, with a few notable ex-
1The web sites http://www.participatorybudgeting.org and http://pbstanford.org provide up-to-
date data on the adoption of participatory budgeting in North America. The list of other cities that
use PB can be found in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Participatory budgeting by country.
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ceptions, the literature so far focused on procedures based on approval ballots, in
which each voter submits a subset of projects that she finds acceptable, and, to a
lesser extent, on ordinal ballots where each voter ranks the projects from the most
to the least desirable one [3]. Here, we study a model where each of the n voters
is given virtual coins worth L/n, where L is the budget limit, and she is asked to
specify how this coin should be split among the projects. Distributing these coins
between projects a voter can not only signal which projects are worthy of funding
but also the intensity of preference. By analogy with the voting theory (see e.g.,
[8]) we call such ballots cumulative votes.
We suggest and study various aggregation methods for PB with cumulative votes
and demonstrate that in the context of PB the use of cumulative ballots is a very
natural choice.
Perhaps the main objection against using cumulative voting is concerned with
the inherent trade-off between expressiveness and cognitive burden: On the one
hand, cumulative ballots allow for expressive votes, in particular they come with
fine-grained information about intensities of voters’ preferences. On the other
hand, they require more effort from the voters. A first answer to this possible crit-
icism is that in the context of participatory budgeting, the gains of expressiveness
can outweigh the increasing cognitive burden; in particular, as we demonstrate
later, most aggregation methods we discuss here for cumulative votes achieve a
significantly better voters’ satisfaction (a term we formally define later) than the
analogous methods with simpler types of inputs.
Furthermore, as cumulative votes generalize both approval and ordinal ballots,2
our methods are applicable to these models as well. This means that voters are not
required to use the full expressiveness of cumulative ballots, but can safely de-
scribe their preferences using approval or ordinal ones (which can then be trans-
lated, by the user interface or the algorithm itself, to cumulative ballots). The
voters who wish to provide their preferences in a more expressive format can still
do that.
We begin our investigation of aggregation methods for participatory budgeting
with cumulative votes by considering three greedy aggregation methods, which
are similar to top-k multiwinner voting rules [14]; we refer to these rules as:
(1) greedy by support; (2) greedy by excess; and (3) greedy by support over cost.
These methods are fairly natural, quite easy to explain, and computationally effi-
2A ranking of the projects can be transformed into a cumulative ballot by applying a certain
positional scoring function, such as Borda, to the ranking, and by normalizing the so-obtained
scores.
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cient. They have, however, certain drawbacks that we will demonstrate by show-
ing their inability to satisfy few desirable axiomatic properties; in particular, these
methods can completely disregard the preferences of minorities. Thus, we con-
tinue our investigation and propose several adaptations of the Single-Transferable
Vote (STV) rule to the PB setting. STV is a well-known ordinal-based multiwin-
ner election rule that is widely used when proportional representation is sought,
e.g., for parliamentary elections.
Our adaptations of STV extend the original rule by: (1) allowing the voters to
specify their preferences as cumulative ballots; and (2) specifying how to deal
with projects with different costs. The different adaptations vary in some key de-
tails. Here we informally describe one of them: Given a budget limit L, each of
the n voters gets a bag of L/n coins which she can then distribute to the available
projects as she wishes. Then, we look at the coin stash next to each project and,
in each iteration, if there is a project which accumulated a sufficient funding, then
we fund it, remove the cost of this project from its stash, and redistribute whatever
is left in the stash to other projects in accord with the preferences of voters con-
tributed to this project. Otherwise, we dismiss a project with the smallest stash
next to it, redistribute its stash to other projects, and proceed iteratively.
We demonstrate the behavior of our rules through illustrative examples, showing
their resilience to certain problems that the greedy rules suffer from. We further
evaluate our STV adaptations by: (1) studying various axiomatic properties of
these rules; and (2) reporting on simulations we performed. We identify one rule,
Minimal Transfers over Costs (MTC), that behaves particularly well with respect
to our axiomatic properties, and that indeed produces proportional results.
2 Related Work
There is a growing body of work on PB and related topics in the social choice lit-
erature (see, e.g., [3]). Firstly, they differ in the type of information solicited from
the voters. Since most PB rules—in one way or another—adapt the existing vot-
ing rules, the input they solicit is usually in the traditional social choice formats:
the voters are either asked to approve some of the projects (and hence disapprove
the others) or to rank projects in accord to their desirability. In approval ballots
voters are asked either to approve a fixed, say k, number of projects [15] or to
approve any set of projects whose total cost does not exceed the budget (knapsack
voting) [19]. Goel et al also use pairwise comparisons as the input format: they
ask voters to compare pairs of projects by the ratio between value and cost. These
4
comparisons are aggregated using variants of classic voting rules, including the
Borda count and the Kemeny rules.
Klamler et al [21] and Lu and Boutilier [23] modified the idea of multiwinner
voting rule which, given the rankings of the alternatives, selects a fixed number
k of alternatives given their costs and a budget. In these works rankings do not
depend on the costs. An `-truncated ballots can also be used instead of full ballots
[5].
A few recent works have considered soliciting cardinal utilities of projects [13,
16], where the voters specify the utility of implementation of each project to them.
Benade et al [4] suggested their version of knapsack voting assuming that voters
vote for the bundle that maximizes their utility. They also suggested to solicit vot-
ers’ rankings of projects by their value (Value voting) or value-for-money (Value-
for-money voting), and the so-called Threshold voting, where each voter specifies
the subset of projects whose value is perceived to be above a predefined thresh-
old. Laruelle [22] assumes that these utilities are implicit and can be calculated
from rankings. We will show that the known rules for PB with cardinal utilities
sometimes exhibit undesirable behavior—in particular, they violate pretty basic
proportionality axioms. In this paper we define rules which do not share these
undesirable features.
The idea of proportional representation in PB transforms into a fairness issue
and it attracted attention of researchers. It should not happen, for example, that no
project is selected among those for which a large minority voted. In particular, the
idea of justified representation for approval based budgeting rules was advocated
in [1] and the idea of proportionality for solid coalitions in the ordinal setting
in [2].
Cumulative and cardinal ballots have been also considered in a divisible model of
participatory budgeting, i.e., for aggregating divisions of available funds among
existing projects, rather than to select projects for funding [12, 18]. A larger
chunk of the literature on cumulative voting concerns single-winner elections;
see, e.g., [24, 6, 8, 27]. Most of this literature, yet, focuses only on practical and
legal aspects of using cumulative voting.
There is a large body of research on the famous voting rule Single Transferable
Vote (STV) and there is some consensus among the social choice community that
it is a particularly good rule for single-winner elections and, especially, multiwin-
ner elections in cases where proportional representation is a desired property; see,
e.g., [26, 10, 9]. This prompted us to adapt STV to PB via cumulative voting. We
also mention the work of Ford [17, Section 3.4] that suggests using a cumulative
version of STV for multiwinner elections.
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The closest research project to ours is that described by accurate democracy.3
There, an iterative procedure for PB that resembles STV is described. From the
rather informal description that is given there we could identify a few key dif-
ferences between the procedure described there and ours—in particular, the rule
there uses both ordinal and cumulative ballots. Also, no axiomatic analysis of the
rule is provided.
3 Formal Model
In our model there is a set of projects P = {p1, . . . , pm}; the cost of a project p ∈
P is a natural number, denoted c(p). There is a set of n voters V = {v1, . . . , vn},
where voter vj expresses her preferences over the projects by assigning a value
vj(p) to each p ∈ P such that vj(p) ≥ 0 and
∑
p∈P vj(p) = 1 (notice that we
refer to both the jth voter and her cumulative vote using the same symbol vj);
intuitively, the value of vj(p) is understood as the fraction of the funds owned by
voter vj that the voter would like to assign to project p.4 We say that a voter vi
supports a project p if vj(p) > 0.
The above notation naturally extends to sets. For each B ⊆ P and each vj ∈ V
we set vj(B) =
∑
p∈B vj(p) and c(B) =
∑
p∈B c(p).
A budgeting scenario is a tuple (P, V, c, L), where P , V , and c are as defined
above, and L ∈ N is a budget limit. An aggregation method is a function (an
algorithm) that, given a budgeting scenario, selects a bundle of projects B ⊆ P
such that c(B) ≤ L.
4 Greedy Rules
In this section we take, arguably, the most straightforward approach, and adapt
known greedy algorithms for participatory budgeting [19] to cumulative ballots.
We start by describing the general class of greedy rules.
Let f be a function that given a project p returns a real value, called the priority
of p. The greedy rule based on f first ranks the projects in the descending order
3https://www.accuratedemocracy.com/p need2.htm
4An alternative approach would be to interpret vj(p) as the fraction of the available funds that
voter j thinks should be assigned to project p. These two interpretations are close and differ in
whether we take the local or the global view on the voters’ preferences. In this paper we take the
local interpretation—we assume that the voters indirectly control the funds, and indicate how parts
of funds that they control should be spread among the projects.
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of their priorities, as given by f . Next, the rule iterates through the ranked list
of the projects,5 in each iteration deciding whether the project at hand will or
will not be selected. Let L(t) denote the remaining budget in the t-th iteration
of the procedure (L(1) = L). In the t-th iteration the rule examines project p: if
c(p) ≤ L(t), then p is selected, and the remaining budget is updated L(t + 1) =
L(t) − c(p). Otherwise, p is not selected, and L(t + 1) = L(t). The following
three aggregation methods are greedy rules:
Greedy-by-Support (GS). This is the greedy rule based on fGS(p) =∑
j∈[n] vj(p).
Greedy-by-Support-over-Cost (GSC). It is based on fGSC(p) = (1/c(p)) ·∑
j∈[n](vj(p) · (L/n)).
Greedy-by-Excess (GE). Based on fGE(p) =
∑
j∈[n](vj(p) · (L/n))− c(p).
Remark 1. We do not consider Greedy-by-Excess-over-Cost as it is equivalent to
GSC.
The first rule described above (GS) can be seen as an adaptation of Knapsack
Voting [19] to cumulative ballots. Yet, all three rules share a negative feature,
namely that a significant part of the population of voters might be ignored when
they split their votes on too many projects.
Example 1. Consider a set P of 20 projects, all having the same cost equal to
one, and a set of 100 voters with the following preferences: The first 60 voters
consider the first 10 projects excellent and they all decide to assign the value 1/10
to each of them. The remaining 40 voters have quite opposite preferences—they
decide to put the utility of 1/10 on each of the last 10 projects. The budget limit is
L = 10. Here, GS, GSC, and GE would select the first 10 projects for funding,
thus effectively ignoring the opinion of a large fraction of the society.
Example 1 also demonstrates the inherent difficulty of achieving proportionality
with cumulative ballots. E.g., one aggregation method using cardinal utilities,
which is known in the literature and considered proportional is based on the idea
of maximizing the smoothed Nash welfare (SNW) [13, 16]. If we simply assume
that cumulative ballots correspond exactly to cardinal utilities, then the rule would
work as follows: For each budgeting scenario (P, V, c, L), SNW would return a
5If f is not injective, then we resolve ties using an arbitrary fixed tie-breaking rule.
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bundle B which does not exceed the limit L and which maximizes the product∏
vj∈V
(
v∗j +
∑
p∈B vi(p)
)
, where v∗j is the maximum value that voter j can get
in any feasible outcome. SNW, when applied to the budgeting scenario from
Example 1 would inappropriately favor the majority of voters—it would select
eight projects supported by 60% of voters and 2 projects supported by 40% of
voters; it would share (yet to a lesser extent) the aforementioned negative feature
of greedy rules.
In the next section we mainly aim at remedying the undesired behavior of GS,
GSC, and GE by offering other aggregation methods which have a visible Single
Transferable Vote (STV) flavor. Indeed, in the instance described in Example 1,
our new methods would select 6 projects supported by the group of 60% voters.
5 Cumulative Single Transferable Vote (CSTV)
Rules
In this section we describe several adaptations of the Single Transferable Vote
(STV) rule to the case of participatory budgeting with cumulative votes. We refer
to these adaptations as Cumulative-STV, or, in short, as CSTV. We first describe
the general scheme, and later discuss several variants, which differ in certain key
aspects regarding their specific operation.
All our variants of CSTV are based on the following compelling idea: Each from
the n voters should be able to decide where to allocate a 1/n-th fraction of the
budget. Correspondingly, we say that a project p is eligible for funding if:
support(p) = L ·
∑n
j=1 vj(p)
n
≥ c(p) .
Notice that the total cost of the projects that are eligible for funding does not
exceed the budget. At first it may seem reasonable to simply pick these projects
and reject the others. This simple strategy, however, might often result in unde-
sirable outcomes. For example, assume that there is a large number of excellent
project proposals, each is liked by almost everyone, and that the voters decided
to distribute their support roughly uniformly among the projects. In such a case
it is possible that no project would be eligible for funding and such a simple rule
would return the empty set (a similar behavior would be observed for the budget-
ing scenario given in Example 1). In order to deal with this and similar situations
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we allow the algorithm to perform certain transfers of the cumulative ballots of
the voters between the projects.
The idea of these transfers is as follows. Since voters do not have any coordina-
tion devices, they may allocate too much money for some projects. If the voter
would be informed that her contribution is not needed for a certain project and
that there will be enough funds without her (or that, even with her support, the
project would not be funded), then she would divert her funds to other projects
she liked. The CSTV rules take care of this oversupply of funds and redistribute
voters’ support on behalf of them.
5.1 The General CSTV Rule
Here we describe the general scheme. To make it a concrete rule, one has to spec-
ify the following subroutines: (1) project-to-fund selection procedure, (2) excess
redistribution procedure, (3) no-eligible-project procedure, and (4) inclusive max-
imality postprocedure. We will discuss these subroutines in the subsequent part
of this section.
The general scheme is as follows: Initialize S = ∅. Loop over the following
until a halting condition is met: If there are projects that are eligible for funding,
choose one such project p according to the “project-to-fund selection procedure”.
If the total value that the voters put on p is strictly greater than the value needed
for selecting the project (i.e., if support(p) > c(p)), then for each voter vj with
vj(p) > 0, transfer a part of her initial support from p to other projects that vj had
initially supported, so that support(p) is as close to c(p) as possible. Such trans-
fers are performed according to the “excess redistribution procedure”, described
below. Next, add p to S, remove it from further consideration, reduce the available
budget, L := L−c(p), and make the voters pay for p, i.e., for all vj , set vj(p) = 0.
Else, that is, if there is no project eligible for funding, perform one of the fol-
lowing actions: (1) select and eliminate a project p; transfer the values that the
voters put on p to other projects, or (2) select a project p and transfer values from
other projects to p so that it becomes eligible for funding. This step is performed
according to the “no-eligible-project” policy. Finally, move to the beginning of
the loop.
After a halting condition is met, the remaining part of the budget might still be
large enough to fund at least one additional project (in such a case, we say that
the bundle of selected projects is not inclusive maximal). If this is the case, we
can run the “inclusive maximality postprocedure”, or leave a part of the available
budget unused.
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Below we write the specific procedures which differentiate between the variants
of CSTV we consider.
5.2 Project-To-Fund Selection Procedure
If there are multiple projects eligible for funding, we pick the one with the highest
priority, using one of the following three priority functions: (1) fGS, (2) fGSC, or
(3) fGE, which we described in Section 4 in the context of greedy rules.
5.3 Excess Redistribution Procedure
In our further study we use the proportional strategy for redistributing the excess.
To describe it formally, let p denote the project currently selected for funding, and
let tran(p) denote the set of voters who put a part of their support to p and also to
some other not yet selected project:
tran(p) = {vj | vj(p) > 0 and ∃p′ /∈ S : vj(p′) > 0} .
We make the payments proportional to the initial supports. We find γ < 1 such
that:
γL
n
∑
vj∈tran(p)
vj(p) +
L
n
∑
vj /∈tran(p)
vj(p) = c(p) .
Intuitively, γ is a factor such that if each voter vj ∈ tran(p) scales her support
for pi by γ, then p will get exactly the support equal to its cost. Next, for each
vj ∈ tran(p) we distribute (1 − γ) · vj(p) among all not yet selected projects,
proportionally to the initial supports that vj assigned to these projects.6
6 There are also other natural possibilities for redistributing the excess. For example, one
could think of an additive version of proportional shares, which we term equal shares. The idea
is to make the voters pay for the selected project as equal shares as possible. Formally, we find λ
such that
L
n
·
∑
vj∈tran(p)
min(vj(p), λ) +
L
n
·
∑
vj /∈tran(p)
vj(p) = c(p) ,
and for each voter vj ∈ tran(p) with vj(p) > λwe distribute the surplus of the support (vj(p)−λ)
among all not yet selected projects, proportionally to the initial supports that voter vj assigned to
these projects.
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5.4 No-Eligible-Project Procedure
We have two alternative procedures to apply when there is no project which is
eligible to funding. These procedures are performed until certain project becomes
eligible for funding.
Elimination-with-Transfers (EwT). Here, we eliminate a project p with either
the minimal excess(p) = support(p)−c(p) or the minimal ratio excess(p)/c(p).
If we chose the GE Project-to-fund selection procedure, then we do the former;
if we chose the GSC Project-to-fund selection procedure then we do the latter.
Once p is chosen for elimination, then for each voter vj who put a part of their
support on p, we transfer this part to the other projects, proportionally to the
initial supports that vj assigned to them. If vj put their support only on p then
no transfers are made. Notice that, if, at any time, there is a project that costs
more than the total amount of money left, then it will be eventually eliminated
and its money will be redistributed.
Minimal-Transfers (MT). We look for a project which may become eligible for
funding if we transfer part of the support from other projects. Formally, we say
that a project p is eligible for funding by transfers if
L
n
·
∑
j : vj(p)>0
m∑
`=1
vj(p`) ≥ c(p) .
That is, p is eligible by transfers if its cost would be achieved provided the
voters who initially put some positive utility value on p would redirect all their
remaining supports towards p.
If we choose the GE Project-to-fund selection procedure, then among all
projects which are eligible by transfers, we select the one that minimizes the
total amount of transfers that are required in order for it to became eligible; i.e.,
the project p which (among those eligible by transfers) has maximal excess(p)
(smallest in absolute value). If we choose GSC as the project-to-fund selection
procedure, then among the projects that are eligible by transfers we pick the
one, p, with the highest ratio support(p)/c(p).
We transfer the supports from other projects to p so that p reaches the eligibil-
ity threshold. We again follow the proportional strategy (cf. Section 5.3). In
Another option would be to adapt an egalitarian criterion and to minimize the maximal transfer
a voter must perform. Hereinafter we do not investigate these strategies in detail, yet we consider
studying them an interesting direction for future work.
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order to define proportional shares we iteratively do the following: First, we
compute the ratio r = support(p)/c(p). If r < 1, then every supporter vj of p
updates her votes. First the voter computes the desired support she should put
to p: vj(p) := min(
∑m
`=1 vj(p`),
vj(p)
r
). Then, such a voter updates her votes,
by proportionally transferring her support from other projects towards p. We
continue the procedure until r = 1.
5.5 Inclusive Maximality Postprocedure
We have two procedures to continue in cases when the algorithm halts but a part
of the available budget is still unused.
Reverse Eliminations (RE). We apply this procedure only when using
Elimination-with-Transfers for selecting non-eligible projects. We iterate over
the not-selected projects in the order reverse to the one in which they were elim-
inated. For each project, we check whether its cost does not exceed the available
funds, and if so we fund it. This procedure is consistent with the logic of EwT,
as EwT can be viewed as a procedure that creates a ranking of the projects:
Whenever it adds a project p for funding, it puts p in the first available posi-
tion in the ranking; when it eliminates p, it puts p in the last available position.
Thus, EwT with reverse eliminations is a greedy procedure that moves in the
order consistent with the ranking returned by EwT.
Acceptance of Undersupported Projects (AUP). This procedure is allowed
only when we use Minimal-Transfers as the no-eligible-project procedure. We
proceed similarly as in MT, but this time we do not check the condition for eli-
gibility by transfers. That is, if we use GE Project-to-fund selection procedure,
then among not-yet selected projects that have their costs no-greater than the
remaining budget, we pick the project p which maximizes:
L
n
·
 ∑
j : vj(p)>0
m∑
`=1
vj(p`)
− c(p) ,
If we use GSC, then we choose p that maximizes:
L
n
·∑j : vj(p)>0∑m`=1 vj(p`)
c(p)
.
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GS EwT MT GSC EwTC MTC
Splitting monotonicity x X X X x x
Merging monotonicity X x x x x x
Support monotonicity x x x x x x
Weak-PR x X X X X X
PR x X X x X X
Strong-PR x x X x x X
Table 1: Axiomatic properties of GS, GSC, and the CSTV variants.
For each voter vj with vj(p) > 0 we transfer all her support from other projects
to p. We add p to S and repeat the procedure until no further project can be
added.
5.6 Selection of Variants
The various design choices described above give rise to a number of aggregation
methods, out of which we consider the following concrete CSTV aggregation
methods: EwT (i.e., GE + EwT + RE), EwTC (i.e., GSC + EwT + RE), MT (i.e.,
GE + MT + AUP), MTC (i.e., GSC + MT + AUP); and out of the greedy rules
we consider GS and GSC. We decided to chose those variants, since in our initial
axiomatic and experimental analysis they gave the most promising results.
6 Axiomatic Properties
In this section we compare our methods according to certain axiomatic properties.
We use these axioms to better understand the behavior of our rules. We concen-
trate on two types of axioms: (1) axioms that relate to monotonicity, as they are
usually quite standard and provide general understanding of rules; and (2) axioms
that relate to proportionality, as proportionality (e.g., taking care for minorities) is
highly desired for participatory budgeting (see, e.g., [1]). Our analysis is summa-
rized in Table 1.
13
6.1 Monotonicity Axioms
In this section we consider three monotonicity axioms. The first two—splitting
monotonicity and merging monotonicity—have been considered by Faliszewski
and Talmon [15], but in the context of approval-based preferences.
Splitting monotonicity requires that, if a funded project p is split into several
projects P ′, according with its cost and the support it got from the voters, then
at least one of the projects of P ′ must be funded. Below we provide a formal
definition.
Definition 1 (Splitting monotonicity). An aggregation method R satisfies split-
ting monotonicity if for each budgeting scenarioE = (P, V, c, L), for each funded
project p ∈ R(E), and for each budgeting scenario E ′ which is formed by split-
ting project p into a set of projects P ′ with the same cost c(p) = c(P ′), and such
that for each voter vi we have vi(P ′) = vi(p), it holds thatR(E ′) ∩ P ′ 6= ∅.
Since splitting monotonicity seems a natural axiom it is quite surprising that only
three of our CSTV rules satisfy it.
Theorem 1. GS, EwTC, and MTC do not satisfy splitting monotonicity, while
GSC, EwT and MTC satisfy the property.
Proof. GS: Consider the following budgeting instance with 1 voter and 2 projects,
p1 and p2. Assume that c(p1) = c(p2) = 2 and that the budget is L = 2. The
cumulative ballot of the single voter v is v(p1) = 0.6 and v(p2) = 0.4. GS would
select p1. Now, assume that we split p1 into two projects, pa and pb, such that
c(pa) = c(pb) = 1 and such that v(pa) = v(pb) = 0.3. Now, GS would select p2,
failing splitting monotonicity.
GSC: First, observe that in order to prove that a rule satisfies splitting monotonic-
ity it is sufficient to consider cases where the project that is to be split is divided
into two parts. Indeed, if the project were divided into more than two parts, one
could use the reasoning for splitting into two projects recursively.
Consider a project p that is about to be split into pa and pb. Observe that either
support(pa)
c(pa)
≥ support(p)
c(p)
, or
support(pb)
c(pb)
≥ support(p)
c(p)
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Indeed, if none of the above inequalities held, then we would have:
1 =
support(pa) + support(pb)
support(p)
<
c(pa)
c(p)
+
c(pb)
c(p)
= 1 ,
a contradiction. W.l.o.g., let us assume that:
support(pa)
c(pa)
≥ support(p)
c(p)
.
Assume that p is selected by the rule. Then, after split, pa would be selected
in the same moment as p was selected, or before. This proves that GSC satisfies
splitting monotonicity.
EwT: Consider a project p that is selected for funding and assume p is split into
two projects, pa and pb. Note that whenever a voter v transfers some value to p
(either as a result of redistributing the excess or as a result of being removed),
then after the split, v transfers to pa and pb the same total value as she transferred
to p—this is because we use the proportional strategy of redistributing values.
Furthermore, v transfers to the other projects the same value as before the split.
Consider the steps of the algorithm before p, pa, or pb is removed or selected. In
each such step we have that:
excess(pa) + excess(pb) = excess(p) .
First, consider the case where neither pa or pb is removed before p is selected or
removed. If p is selected (in such a time moment its support is greater than or
equal to its cost), then either pa or pb is eligible for funding, and so it will be
eventually selected. If p is removed (which means it is added in the RE phase of
the algorithm), then by our assumption pa and pb will be removed after p, and so
they both will be added for funding in the RE phase.
Second, consider the case when pa or pb—say pa—is removed before p is selected
or removed. At the time pa is removed we have that:
excess(pa) ≤ excess(p) .
In that moment we have:
excess(pb) ≥ 0 .
Hence, pb will be eventually selected. As before, the reasoning can be recursively
applied to the case when p is split to any set of projects P ′.
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EwTC: Consider the following instance with 3 projects, p1, p2, and p3. Their
costs are c(p1) = 199, c(p2) = 102, and c(p3) = 200, and the budget is L = 200.
Let us fix a small constant . There are 200 voters with the cumulative ballots
given in the following table:
# votes p1 p2 p3
140 9/14 5/14 0
60 1/6−   5/6
The support of p1, p2, and p3 equals respectively, 100 − 60, 50 + 60, and 50.
Thus, p3 will be eliminated first. The last 60 voters will transfer (almost) the entire
support to p1. Thus, p2 will be eliminated next, and so p1 will be selected.
Now, assume that p1 is split into pa and pb such that c(pa) = 100, and c(pb) = 99.
The voters’ preferences look as follows:
# votes pa pb p2 p3
140 0 9/14 5/14 0
60 1/6−  0  5/6
Then, pa is eliminated first, and the last 60 voters transfer their almost entire
support from pa to p3. Next, p3 is eliminated, and the whole value of the last
60 voters is transferred to p2. Thus, the total support of p2 becomes 110. In the
last step p2 is selected, and neither pa nor pb fit within the remaining budget.
MT: Here the reasoning is similar to the case of EwT. First, we observe that the
sum of transfers to each project stays the same after the split. If at some point p
was eligible for funding, then at this point pa or pb was as well, and so one of these
projects would be selected. Thus, from now on, let us assume that the excess of p
was always negative. Observe that either the excess of pa or pb becomes positive,
in which case the project would be selected, or the excesses of both pa and pb are
greater than that of p. Furthermore, if p is eligible by transfers, then pa or pb is as
well. Thus, pa or pb will be selected at most at the time when p was.
MTC: Consider the instance with 2 projects, p1 and p2, with costs equal to
c(p1) = 150 and c(p2) = 151. The budget is L = 200. There are 200 voters
with the following preferences:
# votes p1 p2
150 1/3 2/3
50 1 0
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In this example, the supports of the two projects are the same, they both are
eligible by transfers, thus MTC selects the cheaper one—i.e., p1.
Now, assume that p1 is split into pa and pb such that c(pa) = 51, and pb = 99.
The voters’ preferences look as follows:
# votes pa pb p2
150 0 1/3 2/3
50 1 0 0
After the split, pa is not eligible by transfers; p2 will be selected, leaving no room
for pa nor pb.
The next axiom is analogous to the previous one, yet it describes merges among
the projects rather than splits.
Definition 2 (Merging monotonicity). An aggregation method R satisfies merg-
ing monotonicity if for each budgeting scenario E = (P, V, c, L), each B′ ⊆
R(E), and for each scenario E ′ = (P \ B′ ∪ {b′}, V, c′, L) such that b′ is
a new project which costs c(B′) and such that for each voter vi we have that
vi(b
′) =
∑
b∈B′ vi(b), it holds that b
′ ∈ R(E ′).
That is, merging monotonicity requires that a project formed by merging a num-
ber of funded projects is funded.
Theorem 2. GS satisfies merging monotonicity, while EwT, EwTC, MT, MTC,
GSC fail merging monotonicity.
Proof. MT, MTC: Consider an instance with 5 projects, p, q, r, s, and z with all
the costs equal to 10. The first 10 voters put the value 0.5 +  to p and 0.5 −  to
q. The next 9 voters put 0.5 +  to r and 0.5 −  to s. The last voter puts 1 to z.
There are n = 10 + 9 + 1 = 20 voters; the budget is L = 20.
Since p and q are eligible by transfers, both MT and MTC will select p first. For
that, most of q’s money will be transferred to p and as a result both rules will
select r in the second iteration. Now, assume that p and r are merged into x. The
merged project is no longer eligible by transfers, but q is still. It will be selected,
and there will be no money left in the budget to buy x.
EwT, EwTC: Consider the following instance with 5 projects, p, q, r, s, and z.
The costs of p, s, and z are equal to 30; the cost of r is equal to 40. If we consider
EwT, then we set the cost of q to 35; if we consider EwTC, we set c(q) = 30. The
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first 30 voters assign value 1 to p. The next voter assigns value 1 −  to p and 
to q. The next 15 voters assign 1−  to q and  to r; the next 40 voters assign 0.5
to r and 0.5 to s; the remaining 9 voters assign 1 to z. The number of voters is 95
and the budget is L = 95. The cumulative ballots of the voters are summarized in
the table below.
# votes p q r s z
30 1 0 0 0 0
1 1−   0 0 0
15 0 1−   0 0
40 0 0 0.5 0.5 0
9 0 0 0 0 1
Here, both EwT and EwTC will select p first. The value of the 31st voter will be
transferred to q. Then, the support for q, r, and swill be 16−15, 20+15, and 20,
respectively. Thus, z and r will be eliminated next; there will be enough money
to accommodate the remaining two projects, thus p, q and s will be selected.
Now assume that p and s are merged into x: it does not reach the threshold.
Indeed, the support of projects x, q and r will be 51− , 15− 14, and 20 + 15,
respectively. Thus, z and q will be eliminated next. The total value of 15 − 15
will be transferred from q to r, raising its support to 35. Thus, xwill be eliminated
next, and r will be chosen, leaving no money in the budget for x.
GSC: Consider an instance with 3 projects p1, p2, and p3 with the costs equal to,
respectively, 5, 10, and 5. The budget is L = 10. There are 10 identical voters,
who assign value 0.35 to p1, 0.6 to p2 and 0.05 to p3. GSC selects p1 first, and
then there will be no money for p2. Consequently, p1 and p3 will be selected. On
the other hand, if we merge p1 and p3, then the rule will select p2.
GS: Observe that merging two projects does not affect the order of consideration
of the other projects apart from the merged ones. Assume we merged pa and pb
into p and that pb was considered after pa by the rule. Thus, p will be considered
in the same or earlier iteration as pa, and there will be enough money to accom-
modate p (since at this moment, before merge, there was enough money to add pa
and pb).
Our next axiom, support monotonicity, requires that moving more support to a
funded project does not hurt it. In the formulation below4 stands for symmetric
difference.
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Definition 3 (Support monotonicity). An aggregation method R satisfies support
monotonicity if for each budgeting scenario E = (P, V, c, L), each project p ∈
R(E), and each budgeting scenarioE ′ = (P, V ′, c, L) such that |V4V ′| = 1 and
for the single voter v ∈ V4V ′ and the single voter v′ ∈ V ′4V it holds that (1)
v′(p) > v(p) and (2) for each p′ 6= p, v′(p′) ≤ v(p′), then p ∈ R(E ′).
Theorem 3. GS, GSC, EwT, EwTC, MT, and MTC fail support monotonicity.
Proof. EwT, EwTC: Consider the following instance with 3 projects, p, q, r. The
costs of all projects are equal to 10. The first 8 voters put 0.5 −  to p, 0.25 to q
and 0.25 +  to r. The next 2 voters put 1 to q and the next 2 to put 1 to r. There
are 12 voters and the budget is L = 12.
Here, p is eliminated first, q is eliminated second, and so r is selected for funding.
Now, assume that all the voters move 2 from q to r. Now, q is eliminated first and
its value is redistributed among p and r in proportions 2 : 1. Thus, r is eliminated
second, and so p is the project selected for funding.
MT: Assume we have 3 projects, p, q and r, with the costs equal to 4, 4 and 8,
respectively. There are 10 identical voters who put utility 0.25 +  on p, 0.1 on q,
and 0.65−  on r. The budget is L = 10.
MT will select p first. Since there will be no money left for r, q will be selected
as a second project for funding. Now, assume that each voter moves 2 from p to
q. Now, MT selects r first and there will be no money left for q.
GS: The instance is similar as for MT. The projects have the same costs but the
voters put 1/3+2 on p, 1/3+  on r and 1/3− 3 on q. Here GS will select p and q.
Now assume that the voters 2 from p to q. After such a change GS will select r.
MTC, GSC: The constructions here are analogous to MT and GS.
Theorem 3 suggest the following interesting open question: does there exist a
proportional rule for PB that satisfies our three monotonicity axioms, in particular
support monotonicity? Does there exist an impossibility result suggesting that the
axioms we consider in the paper are incompatible?
6.2 Proportional Representation
Next we consider proportionality as it is usually desired for PB applications (see,
e.g., [1]); in particular, we see the lack of proportionality of the greedy rules – as
we show below – as their major drawback. Specifically, we introduce three ax-
iomatic properties, of Weak-PR, PR, and Strong-PR. These axioms are new to the
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paper, but similar properties have been considered in the context of participatory
budgeting for different types of voters’ preferences [1, 13].
Definition 4 (Weak Proportional Representation). An aggregation methodR sat-
isfies Weak Proportional Representation (Weak-PR) if for each budgeting scenario
E = (P, V, c, L), for each ` ∈ [L], each set V ′ ⊆ V of voters with |V ′| ≥ `n/L,
and each set P ′ ⊆ P of projects with c(P ′) ≤ `, there exist a scenario E ′ which
differs from E only in the votes of the voters from V ′, such that P ′ ⊆ R(E ′).
Theorem 4. GSC satisfies Weak-PR but GS fails it.
Proof. GS: Consider a scenario with P = {a, b}, c(a) = 1, c(b) = 3, L = 3, and
voters v1, v2, and v3, where voter v1 supports only a, and v2 and v3 support only
project b. For ` = 1, voter v1 acts as a set V ′ of |V ′| ≥ `n/L = 1 and P ′ = {a}
acts as a set of projects with c(P ′) ≤ `; GS, however, selects only project b, as
project b has higher support and, after b is funded, no funds are left to fund project
a.
GSC: Let ` ∈ [L]. Consider a set V ′ of voters with |V ′| ≥ `n/L and a set
P ′ ⊆ P of projects with c(P ′) ≤ `. Set the vote of each v′ ∈ V ′ to support only
the projects in P ′, proportionally: i.e., for each p′ ∈ P ′ set v′(p′) = c(p′)/c(P ′)
and v′(p) = 0 for each p /∈ P ′. Now, the sum of support each project p′ ∈ P ′ gets
from the voters is at least |V ′| · c(p′)/c(P ′), as it gets this amount already from
the voters in V ′. As |V ′| ≥ `n/L, we have that the sum of support of each project
p′ ∈ P ′ is at least `n/L · c(p′)/c(P ′); furthermore, since c(P ′) ≤ `, it follows that
this sum of support is at least n/L · c(p′).
GSC ranks projects according to their sum of support over their cost, so the
“support over cost” value of each p′ ∈ P ′ is at least n/L. We wish to upper bound
the total cost of projects p /∈ P ′ which get a “support over cost” value greater than
n/L: The proof will follow by showing that the total cost of such projects is at
most L − `, because then, GSC would fund all projects p′ ∈ P ′. To show this,
assume otherwise, that the total cost of projects p /∈ P ′ with “support over cost”
value greater than n/L is more than L− `, call the set of these projects S.
Observe that the number of voters v /∈ V ′ is at most n − `n/L. Thus, the
total support divided by the total cost must be lower than n−
`n
L
L−` =
n
L
; hence,
contradiction.
Intuitively, the three axioms that we consider in this section differ in how much
synchronization is needed among the members of a group of voters in order ensure
that these voters will be able to decide about a certain fraction of the budget.
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Weak-PR ensures that a group of at least `n/L can (by coordinating) make a set
of projects P ′ of total cost ` funded; PR merely requires that such voters support
the same set P ′.
Definition 5 (Proportional Representation). An aggregation method R satisfies
Proportional Representation (PR) if for each budgeting scenario E = (V, P, c, L),
each ` ∈ [L], each V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≥ `n/L, and each set P ′ ⊆ P of projects
with c(P ′) ≤ `, it holds that: If all voters v′ ∈ V ′ support all projects in P ′, and
no other projects, then P ′ ⊆ R(E).
Theorem 5. EwT and EwTC satisfy PR but GSC fails it.
Proof. GSC: Intuitively, GSC fails PR because after one project in |P ′| is funded,
its excess gets lost, which might cause the other projects in P ′ not funded.
More formally, consider a budgeting scenario with P = {a, b, c} where c(a) =
c(b) = 1 and c(c) = 3, the budget limit L = 4, and voters v1 and v2, where voter
v1 assigns to project a value 1−  and to project b value , and voter v2 assigns to
project c value 1.
According to PR, with V ′ = {v1}, ` = 2, and P ′ = {a, b}, we have that indeed
both a and b shall be funded. GSC, however, will choose the bundle {a, c}.
EwT, EwTC: Fix ` ∈ [L]. Let P ′ be a set of projects with c(P ′) ≤ `. Let V ′ be a
group of voters who all support all projects from P ′ and no other projects; assume
|V ′| ≥ `n/L.
Recall that we define the support of a project p as:
support(p) = L ·
∑n
j=1 vj(p)
n
.
Let Si be the set of projects picked by the rule (EwT or EwTC) up to the ith
iteration, inclusive. We prove the following invariant: In the ith step the total
support the voters from V ′ assign to the projects from P ′ \ Si equals at least
` − c(P ′ ∩ Si) and no project from P ′ has been eliminated by the rule. The
invariant is clearly true when the rule begins. Now, assume it is true after the ith
iteration, and we will show that it must hold after the (i + 1)th iteration as well.
Observe that in the (i + 1)th iteration the total support of the candidates from P ′
equals at least:
`− c(P ′ ∩ Si) ≥ c(P ′)− c(P ′ ∩ Si) = c(P ′ \ Si) .
Thus, there must exists at least one project, support of which exceeds the cost,
thus no project from P ′ can be eliminated. Furthermore, if a project p′ ∈ P ′ is
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selected, then the amount of support that the voters from V ′ assign to the projects
from P ′ will decrease by c(p′) (the exceed will be transferred only to the projects
from P ′, unless all of them are already selected). This proves the invariant. Since
no project from P ′ will be eliminated, all of them will be picked by the rule.
Below is our strongest proportionality axiom, in which we relax the requirement
that c(P ′) < `. According to Strong-PR, the voters in groups do not have to
strongly synchronize to get projects that they like: intuitively, they only need to
agree on the set of those projects that get a positive support.
Definition 6 (Strong Proportional Representation). An aggregation method R
satisfies Strong Proportional Representation (Strong-PR) if for each scenario
E = (P, V, c, L), each ` ∈ [L], each V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≥ `n/L, and each
P ′ ⊆ P , it holds that: If all voters v′ ∈ V ′ support all projects in P ′, and not any
other project, then either P ′ ⊆ R(E) or for each p ∈ P ′ \ R(E) we have that
c(p) + c(P ′ ∩R(E)) > `.
Theorem 6. MT and MTC satisfy Strong-PR but EwT and EwTC fail it.
Proof. EwT, EwTC: Consider an instance with 2 voters, v1, v2 and 3 projects,
p1, p2, and q, such that c(p1) = 5, c(p2) = 7, and c(q) = 6. The budget limit is
L = 10. Voter v1 puts  to p1 and 1−  to p2. Voter v2 puts 1 to q. The support of
the projects p1, p2, and q will be respectively, 5, 5 − 5, and 5. Thus, both EwT
and EwTC will eliminate p1 first, p2 second, and q last. Consequently, only q will
be selected while Strong-PJR requires selecting p1.
MT, MTC: Fix ` ∈ [L], and consider a group of voters V ′ with |V ′| ≥ `n/L,
and a set P ′ ⊆ P of projects, which are supported by all the voters from V ′;
furthermore, assume the voters from V ′ do not support any other projects.
Let Si denote the set of projects selected by the rule (MT, or MTC) up to the ith
iteration, inclusive. First, we observe that the following invariant holds: In each
iteration i the total support that the voters from V ′ assign to the projects from
P ′ \ Si equals at least ` − c(Si ∩ P ′). Indeed, the invariant is initially true (since
c(S0 ∩ P ′) = 0 and L/n · |V ′| ≥ `), and each time a project p ∈ P ′ is selected,
the total support that voters from V ′ assign to projects is decreased by at most
c(p). Furthermore, the excess of the value that the voters from V ′ assign to p is
redistributed only among the projects from P ′.
Now, for the sake of contradiction, assume there exists a project p′ ∈ P ′ such
that c(p′) + c(P ′ ∩ R(E)) ≤ ` and that has not been selected. Let j be the last
iteration before the rule reached the “Inclusive Maximality Postprocedure” phase
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(possibly j is the last iteration of the rule). Then, clearly c(p′) + c(P ′ ∩ Sj) ≤ `.
By our invariant, we get that in the jth iteration the total support the voters from
V ′ assign to the projects from P ′ \ Sj equals at least:
`− c(Sj ∩ P ′) ≥ c(p′) .
Furthermore, all the voters from V ′ support p′, thus p′ is eligible by transfers.
Consequently, the rule cannot stop nor reach the “Inclusive Maximality Postpro-
cedure” phase. This gives a contradiction and completes the proof.
Proposition 1. Each aggregation rule that satisfies Strong-PR also satisfies PR.
Each aggregation rule that satisfies PR also satisfies Weak-PR.
Proof. Strong-PR → PR: Let R be an aggregation method satisfying Strong-
PR and, counterpositively, assume that R fails PR. Since R fails PR, then, by
definition, there exists a budgeting scenario E = (P, V, c, L), some ` ∈ [L], a set
V ′ ⊆ V of voters with |V ′| ≥ `n/L, a set P ′ ⊆ P of projects with c(P ′) ≤ `, and
a project p ∈ P ′ such that all voters v′ ∈ V ′ support all projects in P ′, and not any
other project, but p /∈ R(E).
Now, sinceR satisfies Strong-PR, then, by definition, for these specific E, `, V ′,
P ′, and p, it holds that either:
1. P ′ ⊆ R(E),
2. for each p ∈ P ′ \ R(E) we have that c(p) + c(P ′ ∩R(E)) > `.
But, for these specific E, `, V ′, P ′, and p, we have that c(P ′) ≤ `, thus the
second condition does not hold (specifically, for each p ∈ P ′R(E) we have that
c(p)+ c(P ′∩R(E)) ≤ c(P ′) ≤ `). Furthermore, the first condition does not hold
as p /∈ R(E). Hence, contradiction.
PR→Weak-PR: Let R be an aggregation method satisfying PR. Thus, by def-
inition, for each budgeting scenario E = (P, V, c, L), for each ` ∈ [L], each set
V ′ ⊆ V of voters with |V ′| ≥ `n/L, and each set P ′ ⊆ P of projects with
c(P ′) ≤ `, it holds that: If all voters v′ ∈ V ′ support all projects in P ′, and not
any other project, then P ′ ⊆ R(E).
So, in particular, there exist possible votes for the voters in V ′ such that P ′ ⊆
R(E); e.g., all voters v′ ∈ V ′ supporting all projects in P ′, each with 1/|P ′|
support, and not any other project. Thus, Weak-PR is satisfied.
Fain et al. [13] studied another axiom, called core, aimed at capturing propor-
tionality for PB. They proved there exists no rule satisfying the core; to the best of
our knowledge, our rules are the first that satisfy a natural weakening of the core.
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Table 2: Statistics of Simulation Scenario 1 (left), Simulation Scenario 2 (right)
and real data from PB in Warsaw (bottom).
(a) Simulation Scenario 1
Rule VS *VS suburbs AR AC
target 100% 100% 40% 0.0 -
GS 23.0 % 20.0% 10.9 % 25.4% 45k
EwT 25.0 % 23.9% 21.6 % 2.1% 25 k
MT 22.6 % 22.2% 31.8 % 3.5% 24 k
GSC 27.6 % 25.4% 15.2 % 11.0% 29 k
EwTC 25.9 % 24.1% 16.7 % 2.8% 27 k
MTC 25.7 % 23.8% 22.9 % 2.9% 28 k
(b) Simulation Scenario 2
Rule VS *VS FoEP AR AC
target 100% 100% 50% 0.0% -
GS 21.2 % 18.9% 65% 27.1% 45 k
EwT 24.4 % 23.1% 32% 12.1% 26 k
MT 22.8 % 22.5% 22% 19.7% 25 k
GSC 27.9 % 26.3% 7% 39.0% 25 k
EwTC 24.5 % 22.7% 41% 8.9% 29 k
MTC 24.3 % 22.9% 40% 11.2% 29 k
(c) Warsaw Instance
Rule VS AR AC
WM 66% 5.1% 860 k
GS 67% 4.6% 804 k
EwT 80% 2.6% 295 k
MT 80% 2.5% 294 k
GSC 81% 2.7% 324 k
EwTC 81% 2.8% 319 k
MTC 81% 2.7% 319 k
7 Experimental Evaluation
To complement the axiomatic analysis provided in the section above, in this sec-
tion we compare our six aggregation methods through computer-based simula-
tions. In particular, we report on simulations done on synthetic datasets as well as
on data collected from real-life PB elections.
In our synthetic simulations we randomly generate instances of PB using the
2-dimensional Euclidean model [11, 9]: We associate each voter and each project
with a point in a 2-dimensional Euclidean space; we refer to this point as the
ideal point of the voter/project. Then, the cumulative ballot of each voter vj is
generated as follows: We first identify the set Sj containing the 10 projects whose
ideal points are the closest to the one of v.7 Then, we let vj support only the
projects from Sj , where, for p ∈ Sj , we set amount by which vj supports p to be
inversely proportional to the distance between the ideal point of p and the ideal
7As we use real numbers, ties are not an issue.
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point of v; specifically:
vj(p) =
∑
j:pi∈Sj
dist(pi, vj(i))∑
pk∈Sj dist(pk, vj(i))
. (1)
We consider two scenarios specifying the distributions of ideal points for vot-
ers/projects and of the costs of the projects:
Simulation Scenario 1: This simulation mimics a situation in a municipality,
containing a city center and several suburbs around it. The ideal points are
drawn as follows: Each point has a probability of 0.6 to fall in a uniform center
disc of radius 0.25 (representing the city center) and a probability of 0.05 to
fall uniformly in one of the eight outer discs of radius 0.06 each (representing
suburbs). The cost of each project is selected from a Gaussian with µ = 50k, σ
= 20k.
Simulation Scenario 2: The purpose of this simulation is to better understand
how the considered rules treat projects with different costs. We consider a city
containing two centers, one with expensive projects and another one with cheap
projects. The ideal points are drawn as follows: We have two uniform discs,
each with radius 0.25. In the left (right) disc the cost of each project is selected
from a Gaussian with µ = 30k, σ = 10k (respectively, µ = 70k, σ = 10k).
For each of the two synthetic scenarios, we generate 1000 PB instances and com-
pute bundle returned by our rules. We also consider data from the following real
instances:
Warsaw Instance: In 2019, 86721 people voted for 101 projects in Warsaw’s
municipal Participatory Budgeting. Each voter could cast an approval ballot and
vote for up to 10 projects. The budget limit was close to PLN 25M (≈ $6.5M).
The selection rule used there was a simple greedy algorithm, which we refer to
as the Warsaw method (WM); WM is equivalent to GS, except that WM takes
approval ballots while GS takes cumulative ballots.
In Table 2, we provide the following statistics (for the synthetic data the values
are averages over all 1000 instances):
Voter Satisfaction (VS): fraction of support of a voter which went on funded
projects (formally, for a winning bundle B, the voter satisfaction of voter v is∑
p∈B v(p)).
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Anger Ratio (AR): the fraction of voters who are ignored in the election (for-
mally, |{v :∑p∈B v(p) = 0}|/|V |).
Average Cost (AC): average cost of a funded project.
Furthermore, for Scenarios 1 and 2 we compute the ∗VS metric:
Voter Satisfaction with Approval Votes (∗VS): instead of using Equation (1),
for each vj ∈ V and p ∈ Sj we set vj(p) = 0.1. This corresponds to using
approval ballots (a voter supports each of her supported projects equally).
Finally, for Scenario 1 we include the fraction of the budget spent on projects
from the suburbs, and for Scenario 2—the fraction spent on projects from the
expensive bundle (FoEP).
Our synthetic simulations show that greedy rules produce large anger ratio com-
pared to CSTV rules; also, greedy rules do not satisfy PR (see Table 1), which
makes them less attractive for PB. We observe that MT is more fair to smaller
districts than EwT and GS, and that MTC is more fair than GSC and EwTC. At
the same time, we infer that MTC, EwTC, and GS do not discriminate expensive
projects as much as the other rules. These results suggest MTC as a particularly
good rule, which is only outperformed by MT with respect to how it treats smaller
districts. On the other hand, MTC performs considerably better than MT with re-
spect to treating expensive projects, as well as with respect to VS and AR criteria.
Our simulations based on the Warsaw Instance dataset show that all our methods,
with the exception of GS, give better results than WM, the method that is currently
used in Warsaw. Bundles selected by our algorithms contribute to larger Voter
Satisfaction and lower Anger Ratio.
We also compared our methods on 18 additional local PBs in Warsaw. In each
of 18 districts there was a separate local PB. The same algorithm was used as
in the municipal PB, but each voter could select up to 15 projects. The results
are consistent with those presented in Table 2. Moreover, in Figure 1 we present
the comparison of Warsaw method and MTC. We can see that according to the
utilitarian criterion (VS), MTC performs considerably better than the solution that
is currently used.
8 Conclusion
We suggested the use of cumulative ballots for participatory budgeting and con-
sidered several aggregation methods for this setting. First, our results, in particular
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the preliminary experimental results presented in Table 2, show that cumulative
ballots indeed can improve voter satisfaction. Moreover, using both our theoreti-
cal results and preliminary experimental results, we identified the MTC rule that,
we argue, shall be given serious consideration for being used in practical settings,
for the following reasons:
• MTC satisfies Strong-PR, hence is guaranteed to behave in a very propor-
tional way, in particular not dismiss minorities – in contrast with, e.g., the
current method usually used in practice;
• MTC is computationally efficient, as can be seen by the procedural descrip-
tion of MTC and validated using our simulations;
• MTC behaves well with respect to our synthetic simulations and in real-
world data, in particular, it outperforms the method usually used in practice
both by increasing the total satisfaction (while still being proportional) as
well as by decreasing the frustration rate.
We discuss several avenues for future research, regarding applying CSTV in gen-
eralized settings. Indeed, while here we considered the standard combinatorial PB
setting, it seems that cumulative ballots and our CSTV rule can be naturally ex-
tended to allow for more complex ballots, thus enabling greater voter flexibility
that hopefully could result in even better outcomes. Specifically, in future work
we plan to consider CSTV for the following settings:
Negative utilities Settings in which voters can express negative utilities – here,
voters could not only state how they wish to split their virtual coin among the
projects, but also specify, for each project, whether the support they give to this
project is positive or negative.
PB with several resource types Settings in which we have not only one type of
resource but several, say time and money – here, voters could get several virtual
coins to split simoultaneously;
PB with project interactions Settings in which there are interactions between
projects, such as in the model of Jain et al. [20], assuming a substitution structure
that is a partition over the projects – here, in addition to their cumulative ballots,
voters could state their preferences regarding substitutions and complementarities
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between projects; furthermore, as our CSTV rules work by support redistribution
on behalf of the voters, we might allow voters to explicitly state how they wish
such redistribution to happen.
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Figure 1: Comparison of WM and MTC. The left (right) picture shows average
VS values (average normalized VS values; i.e., percentage of maximum possible
VS). On the horizontal axis there are names of 18 local PB instances and one
municipal PB instance (the most right one).
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